Assem Abulkhair v. Citibank and Associates by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-28-2011 
Assem Abulkhair v. Citibank and Associates 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Assem Abulkhair v. Citibank and Associates" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 998. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/998 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
BLD-211        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
  
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2059 
 ___________ 
 
 ASSEM A. ABULKHAIR, 




 CITIBANK AND ASSOCIATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 08-02548) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 16, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN AND GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 







 Assem A. Abulkhair appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment on his Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) and breach of contract claims.  





Abulkhair filed a pro se complaint against Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. 
(“Citibank”)1 in the Superior Court of New Jersey, alleging that Citibank discriminated 
against him by closing his credit card accounts because he is a Muslim.  Specifically, he 
asserted a breach of contract claim and a claim under the ECOA.  Citibank removed the 
action to the District Court after being served with the complaint, and moved to dismiss.  
The District Court denied that motion and referred the case to a Magistrate Judge for 
purposes of handling pretrial matters.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 
Abulkhair moved for appointment of counsel, indicating that he sought assistance 
in preparing an amended complaint.  The Magistrate Judge denied that motion because 
the relevant factors weighed against appointing counsel, but ultimately gave Abulkhair 
permission to file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  Abulkhair filed such 
a motion, but the Magistrate Judge denied it on the basis that Abulkhair’s proposed 
amendments were futile.  Abulkhair unsuccessfully appealed that decision to the District 
Court.  He attempted to appeal to this Court, but we dismissed his appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
While Abulkhair’s motion for leave to amend was pending, the Magistrate Judge 
resolved some discovery disputes.  Primarily, Abulkhair sought to depose several of 
Citibank’s current and former employees, but the Magistrate Judge ruled that he would 
not be entitled to take oral depositions.  Instead, she limited him to taking depositions by 
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written questions.  Abulkhair attempted to appeal that order directly to this Court, but 
voluntarily withdrew his appeal after being notified of a potential jurisdictional defect.   
Citibank ultimately moved for summary judgment, arguing that Abulkhair’s 
ECOA claim was time-barred and that both claims failed on their merits.  In response, 
Abulkhair predominantly argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because 
discovery was incomplete.  After hearing oral argument, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to Citibank from the bench, ruling that (1) Abulkhair’s ECOA claim 
was time-barred; (2) Abulkhair’s breach of contract claim failed because, under the 
relevant contract, Citibank had the right to close his accounts and because, regardless, 
there was no evidence that Citibank closed the accounts because of Abulkhair’s religion; 
and (3) no additional discovery was necessary.  The District Court entered summary 
judgment in accordance with its oral opinion and Abulkhair timely appealed.  
II. 
The District Court possessed jurisdiction over Abulkhair’s claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 & 1367.
2
  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 Abulkhair improperly identified the defendant as “Citibank and Associates.” 
2
 Citibank removed Abulkhair’s complaint on the basis that the District Court 
possessed both federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction.  Abulkhair 
moved to remand on the basis that diversity of citizenship was allegedly lacking.  
The District Court correctly denied that motion because, regardless of whether the 
parties are diverse, Abulkhair’s complaint raises a federal question under the 
ECOA and supplemental jurisdiction existed over his related breach of contract 
claim.  Furthermore, the fact that Citibank has offices in New Jersey, a fact that 
Abulkhair emphasizes, is inconsequential for diversity purposes because a national 
banking association is considered a citizen of “the State designated in its articles 
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review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary.  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 
271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In determining whether summary judgment is 
appropriate, we must “view all evidence and draw all inferences in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party . . . .”  Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 192 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  However, “we review the District Court’s refusal to delay its ruling on [a] 
summary judgment motion under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.”  
Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 339 (3d Cir. 2010).  Likewise, we review a 
district court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion.  
Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005).  We may summarily affirm if 
no substantial question is presented by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6.  
A. Summary Judgment 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment to Citibank because 
Abulkhair’s ECOA claim is clearly time-barred and his breach of contract claim fails on 
its merits.  ECOA claims are generally governed by a two-year statute of limitations, 
although in some cases a three year limitations period applies.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f).  
It is undisputed that the alleged ECOA violation in this case occurred in January 2003, 
                                                                                                                                                             
of association as its main office.” Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 
(2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1348.   
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when Citibank closed Abulkhair’s accounts, and that Abulkhair did not file his complaint 
until over five years later, in March 2008.  Furthermore, a January 29, 2003 letter that 
Abulkhair sent to Citibank reflects his awareness that Citibank closed his accounts 
around that time.  Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that, regardless of 
which limitations period applies, Abulkhair’s ECOA claim is time-barred.3  That the 
District Court previously denied Citibank’s motion to dismiss the ECOA claim did not, 
contrary to Abulkhair’s assertions, bar the District Court from later granting Citibank’s 
motion for summary judgment given the different standards that govern those motions. 
The District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Abulkhair’s breach of contract 
claim was also warranted.  To succeed on that claim, Abulkhair must establish an 
enforceable promise, a breach of that promise, and damages resulting from the breach.  
See Guthmiller v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 699 N.W.2d 493, 498 (S.D. 2005).
4
   The 
credit card agreement between Citibank and Abulkhair states that Citibank “may close 
                                                 
3
 Abulkhair’s complaint primarily contends that Citibank discriminated against 
him based on his religion, but also references his ethnicity, suggesting that he 
claimed discrimination on that basis as well.  But even if the complaint could have 
been read to include claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(i)(1), any such claims would 
also have been time-barred.  See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 
369, 382-84 (2004) (four-year statute of limitations governs § 1981 claims based 
on amended version of § 1981, otherwise most analogous state limitations period 
governs); Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 660 (N.J. 1993) (two-year statute of 
limitations governs claims under New Jersey Law Against Discrimination).  
4
 South Dakota law applies to Abulkhair’s breach of contract claim since the 
relevant credit card agreement contains a choice of law provision to that effect.  
See Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2009) (New Jersey 
courts uphold contractual choice of law provisions unless doing so would violate 
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[the account holder’s] account or suspend [his] account privileges at any time for any 
reason without prior notice.”  (Barnette Certification Ex. 1 at 13.)  Accordingly, Citibank 
was entitled to close Abulkhair’s accounts even if he was in full compliance with the 
terms of the credit card agreement, as he contends he was.
5
   
Furthermore, there is simply no evidence in the record to substantiate Abulkhair’s 
claim that Citibank closed his accounts because he is a Muslim.  To the contrary, the 
record reflects that Citibank closed Abulkhair’s accounts in light of “derogatory 
information” on his credit report.  (Barnette Certification ¶ 5.)  The January 29, 2003 
letter that Abulkhair sent to Citibank indicates that Abulkhair received notice of 
Citibank’s decision in that regard, and suggests that he had experienced prior problems 
with identity theft, which may have led to the adverse information on his credit report.   
Perhaps recognizing the absence of evidence in support of his claims, Abulkhair 
opposed Citibank’s motion on the basis that summary judgment would be inappropriate 
in light of his alleged need for further discovery.  He primarily challenged the Magistrate 
                                                                                                                                                             
New Jersey public policy). 
5
 Under South Dakota law, “[e]very contract contains an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing which prohibits either contracting party from preventing or 
injuring the other party’s right to receive the agreed benefits of the contract.”  
Farm Credit Servs. of Am. v. Dougan, 704 N.W.2d 24, 27 (S.D. 2005) (quotations 
omitted and alteration in original).   However, the “obligation of good faith does 
not vary the substantive terms of the bargain, . . . nor does it provide a remedy for 
an unpleasantly motivated act that is expressly permitted by contract.”  Id. at 29 
(quotations omitted and alterations in original).  Abulkhair therefore cannot 
circumvent the credit card agreement’s clear language by alleging a breach of the 
covenant.  Regardless, there is no evidence in the record that would support his 
assertion the covenant was violated.  
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Judge’s decision that he could not take oral depositions, but also argued that Citibank 
never provided him with a copy of his deposition transcript, that Citibank had not fully 
complied with his discovery requests, that the Magistrate Judge forced him to identify the 
accounts at issue to Citibank, and that the Magistrate Judge unfairly limited the scope of 
certain discovery he sought from Citibank – apparently evidence of other lawsuits against 
Citibank alleging discrimination – to a one-year time period.  The District Court 
concluded that Abulkhair had already received “fair discovery” and that there was “no 
reason for any further discovery in the case.”  (Mar. 21, 2011 Hr’g Tr. 17-18.)  
A party opposing summary judgment on the basis that additional discovery is 
warranted must “show[] by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot 
present facts essential to justify its opposition.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).6  “Beyond the 
procedural requirement of filing an affidavit, [the Rule] also requires that a party indicate 
to the district court its need for discovery, what material facts it hopes to uncover and 
why it has not previously discovered the information.”  Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 
1393-94 (3d Cir. 1989).  Abulkhair’s failure to file an affidavit in accordance with Rule 
56(d) might alone be a sufficient reason to approve the District Court’s decision.  See id. 
at 1394 (“This circuit generally requires that a party file a Rule 56(f) affidavit in order to 
preserve the issue for appeal.”).  However, leaving Abulkhair’s non-compliance aside in 
an effort to avoid harsh application of procedural requirements given his pro se status, see 
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993), we find no abuse of discretion in the 
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District Court’s conclusion that no additional discovery was warranted.   
Although the Magistrate Judge precluded Abulkhair from taking oral depositions, 
Abulkhair could have taken depositions by written questions.
7
  While we understand that 
oral depositions might have been preferable to him, Abulkhair still could have acquired 
relevant information by taking advantage of that discovery tool.  His failure to do so 
makes it difficult to conclude that he should have been entitled to additional time for 
discovery.  We also do not see how additional discovery would have helped Abulkhair 
either establish the elements of his breach of contract claim or overcome the fact that his 
ECOA claim is time-barred.  Having considered all of Abulkhair’s objections and the fact 
that discovery in this relatively straightforward case appears to have proceeded for well 
over a year, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that the 
record was sufficiently developed for summary judgment purposes.  See Dowling v. City 
of Phila, 855 F.2d 136, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1988).  
                                                                                                                                                             
6
 Rule 56(d) was formerly Rule 56(f).   
7
 In general, a party who fails to appeal a Magistrate Judge’s pretrial ruling to the 
District Court in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), waives 
review of that ruling by this Court absent “exceptional circumstances.”  
Continental Cas. Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 
1998); see also Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008).  
Although Abulkhair never appealed the Magistrate’s discovery rulings to the 
District Court we think it is appropriate to discuss them on appeal because the 
District Court essentially addressed them in concluding that discovery proceeded 
fairly, Citibank never raised the issue of waiver, and the decisions are necessarily 
intertwined with the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See 
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153 n.2.  Abulkhair also failed to appeal the Magistrate Judge’s 
denial of counsel to District Court.  However, even assuming that ruling is 
properly before this Court, we find no abuse of discretion in the Magistrate 
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 B. Motion for Leave to Amend 
  Albulkhair’s proposed amended complaint sought to assert claims, based on 
essentially the same factual allegations contained in his original complaint, that Citibank 
violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) and New Jersey Bank Parity Act, 
breached a fiduciary duty, and breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing.  He also 
sought to bring claims under “all State and Federal laws and trade acts, intended and 
designated for the purpose of fair dealing for the sole benefit and interests of another, 
with loyalty to those interests for which are Anti-Discrimination.”8  (Amended Compl. ¶ 
19.)  The Magistrate Judge concluded that Abulkhair’s proposed amendments would be 
futile and denied leave to amend.  We find no abuse of discretion in that conclusion. 
Although “[l]eave to amend must generally be granted,” it is appropriate for a 
district court to deny leave when amendment would be futile.  Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 
F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006).  Abulkhair’s amended complaint failed to state a claim 
under the CFA because it did not allege any behavior that would constitute fraud under 
that statute.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2; see also Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 
A.2d 454, 462 (N.J. 1994) (breach of contract does not constitute CFA violation absent 
“substantial aggravating factors”).  Nor does the amended complaint state a claim under 
the New Jersey Bank Parity Act, which governs the rate of interests that New Jersey 
                                                                                                                                                             
Judge’s conclusion that Abulkhair was not entitled to counsel.  See id. at 155-56. 
8
 Although the Magistrate Judge considered the amended complaint to assert a 
new punitive damages claim, Abulkhair had already requested punitive damages 
in his original complaint.   
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Banks can charge.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:13B-1, 17:13B-2.  As for Abulkhair’s broad 
invocation of state and federal law, we note that his original complaint already asserted 
claims under the relevant laws prohibiting discrimination and that those claims are time- 
barred. 
The Magistrate Judge did not specifically address Abulkhair’s attempt to add 
claims based on breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.  However, Abulkhair cannot state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based 
solely on the allegations of his amended complaint, which reflect nothing more than a 
debtor-creditor relationship between himself and Citibank.  United Jersey Bank v. 
Kensey, 704 A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“The virtually unanimous rule 
is that creditor-debtor relationships rarely give rise to a fiduciary duty.”); see also Cowan 
Bros., L.L.C. v. Am. State Bank, 743 N.W.2d 411, 420 (S.D. 2007) (“[T]he relationship 
between a bank and its borrower is generally considered to be a debtor-creditor 
relationship which imposes no special or fiduciary duties on a bank.”) (quotations 
omitted).   Assuming arguendo that the Magistrate Judge should have allowed Abulkhair 
to amend in order to pursue a claim based on breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing claim, any such error in that regard is harmless because that claim fails with 
his contract claim. See supra n. 5. 
In sum, Abulkhair’s appeal presents no substantial question.  Accordingly, we will 
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
